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Abstract 
The distribution of wealth is widening in many countries and with it the 
importance of inherited wealth. In 1974 a Labour Government came to power in 
the United Kingdom committed to introducing an annual wealth tax. It left office 
without doing so. Using the official archives of the time and those of a key advisor 
this paper traces both the origins of the policy and its fate in Whitehall. It explores 
two related questions. What does this experience tell us about the role of the civil 
service in the policy process in the UK and what lessons might be learned by those 
wishing to tackle the issue of widening wealth disparities today?     
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Wealth and the policy process 
Two distinct but linked concerns provoked this paper. One was the revived interest 
in the distribution of wealth as a policy issue internationally and the second the 
fact that over thirty years ago a United Kingdom government came to office 
promising to redistribute wealth by introducing an annual tax on major holders of 
wealth. It gave up the attempt. The National Archives that cover this period are 
now open for study offering an opportunity to examine why this happened. 
 
The renewed interest in wealth and its distribution has been sparked by new 
evidence. A growing concentration of wealth has been reported in several 
advanced economies after many decades of equalisation. The relative importance 
of inherited wealth, compared to wealth amassed over a lifetime, has also begun to 
grow recently in countries for which we have good long term data (Roine and 
Waldestrom 2009). In France, which has uniquely good information on individual 
wealth over time, there was a striking decline in the concentration of wealth and in 
the importance of inheritance from 1914 to 1945. That trend ended in the 1980s 
and since then has reversed sharply (Piketty 2011). With lower economic and 
demographic growth Piketty predicts that:    
„inheritance will eventually matter a lot pretty much everywhere - as 
it did in ancient societies. Past wealth will tend to dominate new 
wealth, and successors will tend to dominate labor earners‟. (2011: 
42) 
 
Wealth is spread far more unequally than income (OECD 2008; National Equality 
Panel 2010). Yet, taxes on annual net wealth have been systematically abandoned 
in most OECD countries in the past two decades (OECD 2010). In 2010 the 
Coalition Government in the United Kingdom repealed the previous government‟s 
meagre but innovative attempt to redistribute wealth in favour of poor families – 
the Child Trust Fund. This scheme had been part of what advocates saw as a new 
social policy strategy – asset based welfare or giving the poor greater access to 
capital (Paxton and White 2006). A major independent review of the United 
Kingdom tax system has recently suggested that government should consider 
taxing wealth more effectively on efficiency as well as equity grounds (Mirrlees 
Review 2011).  
 
Beyond these „advanced economy‟ debates a wider question has been posed. If 
rights to life and liberty are being denied because of extreme poverty in some parts 
of the world may that not justify a levy on the wealth enjoyed by the people of rich 
nations if that can help relieve such destitution (Pogge 2007)?   
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The last time a government was elected in the United Kingdom with a promise to 
introduce an annual tax on wealth it failed to keep that promise. This experience 
prompts several questions. Why was such a promise made? Why did the 
government abandon the idea? Why did the Labour Government of 1974-6 fail to 
adopt a different and possibly more practical means of redistributing wealth that 
was then on offer? What might future policy makers learn from this experience?  
 
These questions lead onto a second and wider reflection on the policy process. 
Texts on the subject (Levin 1997; Hall 1993; Kingdon 1984; 2003; Bochel and 
Bochel 2003) and individual case studies (Hall, Land, Parker and Webb 1975; 
Dunleavy 1981; Butler 1992) tend to focus on achieved change. What interest 
groups, power brokers, historical contingencies, past policy decisions or key 
research findings contributed to a new policy or institutional creation? Rarely do 
scholars ask – what prevented change from happening? There is a tradition of 
writing about „non policy making‟ (Lukes 1974; Bachrach and Baratz 1970; 
Crenson 1971; Newby 1978) which discusses why some issues fail to get onto 
political agendas. There are studies of policies that fail after being legislated. The 
poll tax is one example (Butler, Adonis and Travers 1994). But governments do, 
from time to time, gear themselves for action and then retreat. This is less studied 
but may be just as revealing of the policy process. What can the retreat on wealth 
tax policy between 1974 and 1976 contribute to that discussion? 
 
Taxing wealth   
In the early part of the twentieth century modest annual taxes on wealth were 
introduced in Scandinavia and then in other European countries. India followed in 
1957. France had taxed transfers of wealth and regulated inheritance ever since 
1791 but in 1981 introduced an additional graduated annual „solidarity tax‟. In the 
past two decades, however, annual taxes on wealth have been largely abandoned 
across Europe. Austria, Denmark and Germany abandoned them in 1997, Finland, 
Iceland and Luxembourg in 2006, Sweden in 2007 and Spain in 2008.  
 
The precipitating reasons have differed. The tax was declared unconstitutional in 
Germany because of lack of clarity about the rationale underpinning its valuations 
of wealth. In Spain the government recently reduced taxes on property to 
compensate for the impact of the banking crisis. The French tax is under review 
and may be abolished because of its unpopularity and complexity. Wealth taxes 
survive in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Norway. In the United States the 
Estates Tax („death tax‟) was being phased out and was to attract only a zero rate 
in 2000 (Graetz and Shapiro 2005). It was restored and levied at a rather lower rate 
under President Obama. Everywhere, however, the growing international mobility 
of capital has worried governments and constrained wealth tax policies.  3 
 
In his study of contemporary British history Harrison (2010) takes the failure of 
the Labour Government to pass its promised wealth tax in 1974-6 as an early 
example of the fight back by the landowning and middle classes against growing 
trade union power and the drive for social equality. This counter attack continued 
through the 1980s under Mrs Thatcher‟s premiership. But the landowning class‟ 
success in defeating the wealth tax, he argues, began a revival of landed wealth. A 
close reading of the government archives suggests a rather more nuanced 
interpretation of these events in which the role of the Treasury and weaknesses in 
Labour‟s policy design play a part.   
 
1974-9: A post-War break point 
It is true that this period saw a significant change in the political and economic 
climate. In 1976 the Labour Government had to call on the International Monetary 
Fund to rescue it from a major run on the pound. An unsustainable level of 
inflation was linked to public expenditure growth unmatched by likely revenue. 
The steady expansion of social spending that had taken place since the Second 
World War was checked. Trade union power reached its peak in 1974. Over half 
of the employed population were members of trade unions. By 2010 the 
comparable figure was just over a quarter and only15 per cent in the private sector.  
Unions were powerful not just within particular industries but had the capacity to 
shape economic policy. Provoking a recession to check wage inflation was still 
seen as an unacceptable strategy, so negotiation and compromise with the trade 
union movement were deemed a necessary strategy by both major parties. The 
National Union of Miners engaged in a battle against the government‟s wages 
policy that resulted in a three day working week and electoral defeat for the 
Conservative Government in February 1974. Inflation was to rise by more than 20 
per cent and wages by more than a quarter during 1974-5.   
 
To win trade union agreement to some kind of wage restraint the Labour Party 
agreed, before the election, to introduce a range of measures that would 
„fundamentally redistribute income and wealth‟. Social policy legislation was to 
include increases in pensions, a new child benefit, reductions in public housing 
rents and a new annual tax on wealth. It is clear from the accounts of some those 
involved at the time that the trade unions had the upper hand in determining the 
content of this „social contract‟ (Barnett 1982; Donoughue 2006). The Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury at the time has argued that the whole shape of Labour‟s 
economic policy during that period was set in the deal done with the TUC in 
1973/4 (Wass 2008). It is some measure of the balance of power at the time that 
Barbara Castle, the Secretary of State for health and pension policy was unable to 
announce her plans to the Parliamentary Labour Party in early 1974 – attending a 
TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee had to take precedence (Castle 1980).  4 
 
When the crisis came to a head in late 1976 the IMF required major cuts in public 
spending in order to give its support. Cuts were agreed to after an initial defeat in 
Parliament caused by a rebellion of Labour back bench members. The new Prime 
Minister Callaghan and the Chancellor Healey drove through a modified package 
of cuts after a two day debate in Cabinet recorded in Tony Benn‟s diaries (Benn 
1989: 661-88). In the longer term the Treasury was able to impose a new „cash 
limits‟ regime  controlling future spending plans (Thain and Wright 1995) and a 
post-Keynesian framework for economic policy.    
 
The experience of these years decided Mrs Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph, her 
ideological mentor, that Conservatism had to change fundamentally (Thatcher 
1995; Joseph 1976). Trade union power must be challenged and defeated. 
Creeping state expansion had to be reversed. In short, the politics of the post war 
period changed for good (Marquand 2008; Harrison 2010). It is against this 
background that the debate about taxing wealth took place in 1974. It was a debate 
that had a long history.             
 
The origins of the idea of an annual wealth tax for the UK 
The practice of taxing the transfer of estates at death in the UK began, in a 
coherent way, in 1894. Though initially modest the top tax rate rose significantly 
over time. In 1894 the  very largest estates attracted a tax of 7.5 per cent. By 1930 
that had risen to nearly 40 per cent. After the Second World War it rose to 65 per 
cent. In 1949 Sir Stafford Cripps the Labour Chancellor raised the top rate to 75 
per cent. However, the tax collected relatively little revenue as people found 
increasingly ingenious ways to avoid it, notably by giving assets away before 
death. In the mid-1960s revenue from death duties only amounted to 0.6 per cent 
of total personal wealth. (Atkinson 1972). Failure to tax wealth more effectively 
began to exercise some in the Labour Party after it went into opposition in 1951. A 
coherent alternative tax strategy began to emerge only slowly, however. The key 
figure was Nicholas Kaldor, then Reader in Economics at Cambridge University. 
He was concerned about the then high marginal rates of income tax and their 
impact on work incentives. But he was also concerned about the inequity of a 
system that took no account of an individual‟s assets in assessing capacity to pay 
tax. In his papers for the Fabian Tax Group in 1951/2 he recommended imposing 
an annual wealth tax as a replacement for „surtax‟ – the additional tax on high 
earners (Kings College Cambridge: Kaldor papers: NK/1-17).  
 
It was in early 1951 that the Labour Government set up a Royal Commission to 
review tax policy. (The terms of reference were amended in 1952 by the new 
Conservative Government permitting it to recommend reductions in the overall 
total of revenue raised from profits, wages and salaries.) As part of its remit it 5 
 
discussed whether there were alternative forms of tax that would be less damaging 
to work effort than high rates of income tax. The Commission produced three 
reports in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Nicholas Kaldor was a member. During this 
period he developed his ideas for an expenditure tax to replace income tax across 
the board. All sources of spending power should be taxed equivalently he argued - 
the capacity to cash assets, rising capital worth and gifts. He failed to persuade his 
fellow commissioners on this or on his proposal for a capital gains tax. (Cmd 7494 
1955). A Memorandum of Dissent making the case for an expenditure tax was 
written by Kaldor and also signed by George Woodcock (later General Secretary 
of the TUC) and H.L. Bullock. Kaldor (1955) then published a book setting out 
the case for an expenditure tax at some length.  
 
For a tax to be fair, Kaldor argued, it must take account of peoples‟ capacity to 
pay. If someone had a fortune in the bank their capacity to pay income tax was 
much greater than someone who had no reserves. Similarly a capital gain realised 
in any tax period increased that person‟s capacity to pay. Kaldor‟s preferred tax 
was one levied on all kinds of receipts – wages and salaries, proceeds from the 
sales of assets, capital gains, bequests, gifts and repayment of loans minus long 
term investments and net saving over the year. He also acknowledged that there 
was a case for taxing both wealth and expenditure since:  
„capital and income constitute two distinct though mutually 
incomparable sources of spending power‟ ….„a separate tax on each 
provides jointly a better yardstick of taxable capacity than either 
form of taxation by itself.‟ ….„some countries, notably Sweden, do 
provide for an annual progressive tax on capital‟ (Kaldor 1955: 33).  
 
Kaldor‟s book became a basis for academic discussion of tax policy in the next 
few years (Due 1960). His basic argument and its constituent tax elements were to 
form the main basis of Labour‟s tax policy until 1979 (Whiting 2000, chapter 3). 
However convinced insiders on the party‟s economic policy committee might have 
been the party was never sufficiently convinced to make taxing wealth a major 
plank of policy. Part of the reason may lie in the internal debate the party was 
having about the very nature of socialism. How far should socialism be associated 
with public ownership of the means of production or was it about deeper goals 
such as achieving more equality, spreading opportunities and a higher quality of 
life to all sections of the community?  Anthony Crosland‟s classic attack on 
traditional Marxist thought within the Labour Party (Crosland 1956) was to have 
profound consequences for the Labour Party‟s programme on which it was elected 
in 1964 (Ellison 1994). It is usually remembered for its shift of emphasis from a 
concern with nationalisation to one that gave much more emphasis to social 
policy. What is often forgotten is that Crosland‟s famous volume, The Future of 
Socialism, contained two whole chapters on the redistribution of wealth. He 6 
 
advocated a „concerted attack on the mal-distribution of wealth‟ and a six point 
programme that included all of Kaldor‟s ideas and others, like a land tax. 
However, for the more Marxist left it was still the ownership of capital and the 
power it brought that was the key to a changed society. Taxation of wealth 
holdings and other means to pay for social welfare were not the answer (Brown 
1971).     
 
In the run up to the 1964 election the Labour Party Tax Working Party produced 
an internal report, this time with a long paper by Kaldor setting out the case for an 
annual tax on wealth.  
„We are in favour of an annual Wealth Tax [on the grounds 
explained by Prof Kaldor in RD 677] namely that it is not only 
income but wealth which represents spending power and that an 
equitable tax system should take account of both‟. (NK 1-17: LP RD 
742, April 1964)  
 
The committee‟s first priority recommendation, however, was to tax capital gains. 
That was included in the 1964 election manifesto and was implemented in 1965. It 
was not until the special circumstances that obtained in 1974 that the party was 
persuaded to include in its manifesto a pledge to tax wealth on an annual basis as 
part of its deal with the TUC where support for tax was strong. Its absence in 
previous election pledges or prior major public discussion, however, meant that 
there was little preparation for what was a significant move – a point to which we 
return.    
 
The Labour Party Manifesto said:  
„Redistribute income and wealth. We shall introduce an annual 
Wealth Tax on the rich; bring in a new tax on major transfers of 
personal wealth; heavily tax speculation in property – including a 
new tax on property companies‟.  (Labour Party Manifesto 1974) 
But just as the Labour Party had become converted to the principle of an annual 
tax on wealth the idea was attracting critics not just from the City and traditional 
Conservative opinion but also from those who were sympathetic to some kind of 
redistribution of wealth (Sandford 1971; Atkinson 1972).     
 
The most comprehensive account of wealth distribution at the time was that by 
Atkinson (1972). He agreed with Kaldor that there were both efficiency and equity 
grounds for taxing wealth but he concluded, like Sandford, that the administrative 
costs and difficulty of measuring individuals‟ wealth annually for tax purposes 
made it impractical. It would be better to tax those who received transfers of 
wealth.  7 
 
„The life time capital receipts tax would be the most effective way in 
which wealth-transfer taxation could contribute towards bringing 
about greater equality in inherited wealth. Most importantly it would 
provide a clear incentive for donors to spread their wealth widely.‟ 
(1972: 184)   
 
Perhaps because new ideas take time to take root, perhaps because it would have 
been difficult to change the trade unions‟ established policy stance so late in the 
day, perhaps because the authors were young newcomers, like Atkinson, or 
outside the Labour policy community like Sandford, the Labour Party did not take 
up this idea. It did press ahead with a Capital Transfer Tax which taxed the giver, 
the tax rate increasing with the level of gifts over a lifetime. Simultaneously the 
government machine began work on how to tax individuals‟ total wealth on an 
annual basis as the Labour Manifesto had promised.   
 
A favourable initial response  
The Inland Revenue had been alert to the possibility that Labour might want to 
introduce a wealth tax as early as 1963 when its first recorded notes on the topic 
discussed what administration and staffing might be needed to implement it (The 
National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew. IR40/18573). This work was taken 
further in preparation for what was thought to be the likely return of a Labour 
Government in 1970.  The Revenue returned to the issue briefly in 1972. But then 
in early 1974, with the Labour Party‟s clear commitment to such a tax, a major 
brief was written, drawing on the earlier work. It was to await an incoming Labour 
Chancellor. It was on Denis Healey‟s desk by early March 1974.  
 
The brief discussed what wealth should be included, the thresholds at which the 
tax could begin to be levied and possible dangers like avoidance and capital flight.  
But the overall content of the memo was very positive. It concluded that such a tax 
was feasible and that the government should move quickly to implement it so as to 
limit capital flight and avoidance. The number of civil servants it would involve 
and how many regional offices were all included. A timetable was suggested – a 
Green Paper by July 1974, a decision by November and inclusion in the Finance 
Act 1975.  
 
The brief did question the suggestion the Labour Party had made in opposition that 
the top rate of tax could be as high as 5% a year. In combination with other taxes 
the paper pointed out, this would involve a very high marginal rate of tax 
compared to an individual‟s income in any one year. It was well above wealth tax 
levels then in operation in other European countries. But the paper concluded:  8 
 
„The main purpose of this minute has been to let the Chancellor 
know that although there will of course be many problems to be 
resolved we see no reason why a wealth tax should not be introduced 
reasonably quickly‟ (TNA: PRO. IR40/18573). 
 
Healey was delighted and congratulated the Revenue. The paper, however, 
included what turned out to be a critical suggestion.  
„The Chancellor may also wish to consider the possibility of having 
the structure of the tax (as opposed to the desirability of introducing 
it) examined by a Select Committee  [of the House of Commons] as 
for example on Corporation Tax in 1971 and on Tax Credit in 1972‟.  
 
This was a reasonable idea in some ways, opening the policy to wider scrutiny of 
the technical issues, but it was also politically naïve. The forum chosen was bound 
to provoke objections to the very principle from the Conservative members and 
gave them the capacity to delay matters whatever the technical issues. The 
Chancellor did not respond to the select committee suggestion but did take up the 
idea of a Green Paper and accepted the provisional time table. The Revenue set to 
work to prepare a Green Paper for publication in June/July 1974, though in the end 
it was delayed until August (Cmnd 5704, 1974). The likely timing for legislation 
was inclusion in the 1975 Finance Act with the first valuations of wealth to take 
place at the end of that year. The first wealth tax returns would be filed after April 
1976 [TNA: PRO. IR 40/18573] . 
 
It is interesting that this paper did refer to the criticisms that Prof Sandford and 
colleagues (1973) at the new Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) had made of the 
Labour Party‟s proposals the previous autumn. Like Atkinson they had argued that 
a tax on receipts of major gifts would be preferable.  
 
The Revenue‟s response to this idea is instructive. The Revenue agreed that 
„changes on these lines would go a long way to remove major concentrations of 
wealth‟. But they argued that it would produce much less revenue. People would 
give away their wealth in small packets to family or to charities. This might 
redistribute wealth, the paper conceded, but it would not raise the government 
much money. Perhaps this view is not surprising. Raising revenue was after all the 
Revenue‟s job! But given that the major thrust of the Labour Manifesto had been 
to reduce wealth inequality that objective was surprisingly lightly dismissed. In 
their defence the Revenue could reasonably argue that the Manifesto had been 
quite clear. The government was to implement an annual wealth tax not an 
„accessions tax‟, as the tax on receipts came to be called. It was also pressing 
ahead with the Capital Transfer, or gifts tax, that would tax transfers made over a 
lifetime not received by the giver but made by the donor.        9 
 
There was little Treasury input at this time. They clearly thought of the issue as a 
technical Revenue responsibility. In short, the early civil service reaction was 
workmanlike and favourable to getting on with the job. The Government needed 
more revenue and this was one way the elected representatives had decided to 
gather it.    
 
Doubts begin 
From this point on, April 1974, however, the Treasury began to become more and 
more sceptical. Civil servants began to look more carefully at the practical 
problems and the wider economic impact. Opposition from external interests 
began to emerge. Representations were made to the Treasury by the National 
Farmers‟ Union, various bodies representing the owners of country houses, small 
businesses, the City, and the Bank of England. These mostly received polite brush 
offs and reassurance. But opposition to both the Capital Transfer Tax and the 
Wealth Tax from the owners of country houses and the museums and the art world 
did prompt a rethink of the treatment of such property as „national treasures‟. A 
successful campaign was launched that attracted a million signatures in defence of 
the English country house (Mandler 1997; see also House of Lords debate 
Hansard, 26th June 1974).    
 
It was other matters that really worried the Treasury. The weakness of the 
economy, rising inflation and the threat to sterling increasingly engaged civil 
servants until it dominated almost everything they considered (Wass 2008). An 
internal note dated 20th May 1974 was entitled „Wealth Tax – possible exodus of 
UK capital‟ (TNA: PRO T328/1017.).  Harold Lever, Harold Wilson‟s advisor on 
financial matters, wrote to the Prime Minister on 7th June putting the Wealth Tax 
in the context of other things the government were trying to do.  
“We are now running a serious risk of a crisis of confidence in the 
business world - inflation, price controls, a fall in real assets…,” all 
coming together. 
„The Green Paper on a wealth tax will make a crucial impact on 
confidence- it will be almost a touch stone of our attitude towards 
enterprise and wealth‟(TNA: PRO T 328/1018). 
In a later note he says: 
„This Green Paper is political dynamite….as we are breaking what 
for us is very new ground we will have less trouble if we give 
Parliament an opportunity of looking at our proposals in detail 
before legislation….. Any resultant delay in legislation is I believe 
tolerable if it leads to a more acceptable and workable scheme‟. 10 
 
Kaldor, however, thought a Select Committee at best would be „pointless.‟ Worse, 
it would result in the loss of political momentum (TNA: PRO T328/1019). 
 
Treasury worries come to a head.  
Treasury concern grew. A note on 1st July to the Permanent Secretary expressed 
concern at the weight that a whole range of measures might have on „confidence‟. 
They included the nationalisation of shipbuilding, and aerospace, a „large stake‟ in 
the top 100 firms, large public spending commitments as well as the wealth tax. 
 
The possibility of a negative income tax, long term pension reform, benefits to 
single parents and a „family endowment‟ scheme were „cumulatively very 
expensive‟. There was also community ownership of development land on the 
agenda. „If confidence is still in a jittery state the sheer volume of announcements 
in the next few weeks could have a depressing effect‟ (TNA: PRO T328/1020)  
 
So at a meeting on 10 July 1974 of the Chancellor, all the other Treasury ministers 
and senior officials it was agreed that everyone was broadly content with the 
Green Paper. But there was “a problem of timing”. It was agreed to put off 
publication until mid-August before the Chancellor‟s holiday and after the House 
of Commons economic debate. Crucially there was “general support for asking for 
a Select Committee to look at the WT” (TNA:T PRO 328/1021). 
 
The draft was to go to the Cabinet sub-committee on Economic Strategy at the end 
of July. The aim was to publish the White Paper on the Capital Transfer (Gift) Tax 
and the Wealth Tax Green Paper on the same day – 8 Aug.  
 
The Green Paper went to the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Strategy on 29 July (TNA: PRO T328/ 1022). At this meeting, which for the first 
time involved non-Treasury ministers in the discussion, there was disappointment 
that there would not be legislation before 1976. The Select Committee route might 
be undesirable other ministers suggested. It would be better to have a White Paper 
and get the views of the House in debate not delay with a Select Committee. But 
this view did not prevail.   
 
This was to be the high tide of optimism about implementing the tax. From then 
on the government lost the initiative and the argument. The Treasury had won a 
crucial delay. Kaldor‟s fears about the Select Committee were fully justified. The 
Conservative members opposed, obstructed and delayed. They mounted a 
formidable attack on the very idea. Academics who thought this was not the way 
to tax wealth and the range of lobbies who opposed it in principle dominated 
discussion and the presentation of evidence. The Committee‟s expert advisor Prof 11 
 
Willis was one of the IFS authors who had been critical of an annual tax 
(Sandford, Willis and Ironside 1973). Certainly the advocates of such a tax never 
put together a convincing riposte to the barrage of criticism the hearings provoked 
(HC 696 I and II 1974/5).       
 
The Treasury’s internal rethink 
The committee process had brought all the Treasury‟s doubts to a head. It had 
forced those affected to marshal their arguments. It had provided a platform for the 
critics and tested the strength of the government‟s case especially on the form the 
tax was to take. The critics who favoured a different way to tax wealth were able 
to expand on their view and get a much wider audience. It had also forced the 
Treasury to confront the detail in preparing briefs for the committee and to answer 
the critics‟ case.     
 
The old worry that such a tax would provoke a capital flight, and be a danger to 
the core activities of the City, had been reinforced. It had done so at a time of 
growing pressure on the pound. One paper, after reviewing the likely impact of the 
tax, concluded that a wealth tax:   
„1. Will lead people to seek non-resident status, result in a 
considerable outflow of funds in the form of dividends and interest. 
2. Since it will apply to all wealth held world-wide foreign 
employees in foreign companies resident here would be subject to 
tax. This would result in a big movement of banks, insurance and 
shipping business moving out of the UK. 
3. Assets held here would be affected. This would reduce the level of 
business in UK‟ (TNA: PRO T328/1249). 
 
There was a meeting of those civil servants most involved with the Permanent 
Secretary. There were no politicians or outside advisers present (TNA: PRO 
T328/1252). The minutes were marked „secret‟. They concluded that the tax 
would produce little revenue, be extremely difficult to administer and risk serious 
damage to the economy and run into serious opposition.  It was agreed that the 
Chancellor should be approached. In its advice the Treasury said:  
„We would of course seek to minimise these difficulties...but…the 
present prospect is another rough ride for ministers with criticism 
outweighing support‟ (TNA; PRO T328/1252). 
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The Chancellor agreed he would speak to the Prime Minister. On the 2nd July 
1975 a briefing note was written for the Chancellor who was to see the Prime 
Minister and propose that the legislation for a wealth tax be postponed until 1977 
(TNA: PRO T328/1253). The Chancellor saw Wilson the Prime Minister on the 
26th July (TNA: PRO T328/1254) and a postponement was agreed.  
 
Over the next year little advance was made on the details. The battle over cuts in 
public spending and the IMF loan took over the Treasury‟s concerns. A new Prime 
Minister Callaghan was in office. He had steered the cuts through a divided 
Cabinet. There was some worry about the likely impact a decision to abandon the 
tax would have on the unions. One civil servant wrote to his superior to question 
how the TUC might react. By implication the question was – how are we going to 
get them to agree to contain wage rises if we have not kept to our side of the 
bargain? His superior sent the memo back with a hand written note on it:  
„Let us cross this bridge when we come to it. We have won a battle 
for “efficiency” not the war‟. (memo from R. Fox with this penned 
response from Alan Lord  TNA: PRO T336/108) 
 
In the event it was concern about the markets‟ reaction to a white paper that 
trumped concern about the TUC. 
„Our economic and financial management is now under more critical 
international scrutiny. There is a risk that the issue of a White Paper 
foreshadowing a WT would look irrelevant and unnecessarily 
provocative‟  (A note to the Chancellor 10 June 1976 TNA: PRO 
T366/108). 
 
On 21st June the Chancellor wrote to the Prime Minister saying they should not 
publish a white paper at all – effectively abandoning the whole idea. Harold Lever 
wrote to the Prime Minister PM (24th June) strongly supporting that view. The 
matter was put to the „EY Cabinet Committee‟ for decision. It concurred (TNA: 
PRO T366/108 ). 
  
A written answer appeared in Hansard 29 Nov 1976 announcing that the 
government would „not introduce a wealth tax in the life of this parliament‟ 
(Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Written Answers, 29 November 1976.). 
 
The Treasury tax group wrote a long retrospective brief on what had gone wrong 
(TNA: PRO T366/108). It began with a discussion of the key confusion or conflict 
of objectives that had dogged the project from the outset, as they saw it. There 
were two different and confused objectives the paper concluded:  13 
 
  To achieve equity between taxpayers with and without wealth – the unequal 
capacity to pay argument.  
  To achieve equity in wealth holdings – the redistribution of wealth. They 
quoted Healey‟s introduction to the Green Paper that suggested this was the 
key goal. But the scale of taxation needed to do this had never been faced up to 
by politicians the note argued.    
  Moreover, that goal was already being achieved by what seemed to be the 
natural process of economic change and the existing taxes on wealth.  This 
would be especially true after the introduction of the Capital Transfer Tax.   
 
This last conclusion drew on previous Treasury work that had estimated that the 
share of wealth owned by the top one per cent had fallen substantially over the 
century and would continue to fall even without a wealth tax. The first observation 
has been confirmed by later research (Feinstein 1996). The latter prediction has 
not.    
 
Lessons  
Two different sets of questions arise. The first concerns the substance of the policy 
in question. Was the attempt to tax wealth on an annual basis simply the wrong 
way to approach the problem of moderating unequal wealth?  Was a better way on 
offer and ignored? If so why? What should those concerned with the growing 
concentration of wealth learn from this experience?  
 
A second set of questions concerns the process of social policy making. Have we 
given sufficient attention to the role of the civil service in the policy process? Did 
the Treasury merely perform the constitutional task expected of it? Did it save the 
country from a foolish policy? Was it an example of „policy success‟ as one 
reviewer of this paper put it? Or does this glimpse into the inner workings of 
government suggest that the barriers to radical change are higher than many in the 
social policy community are prepared to recognise?  
 
It is appropriate to begin with the narrower policy question first – was the tax a 
mistake?  
 
Denis Healey‟s own reflective conclusion was that it was a mistake. 
„Another lesson was that you should never commit yourself in 
Opposition to new taxes unless you have a very good idea how they 
will operate in practice. We had committed ourselves to a Wealth 
Tax: but in five years I found it impossible to draft one which would 14 
 
yield enough revenue to be worth the administrative cost and 
political hassle.‟ (Healey 1989: 404)   
 
It seems clear that the Labour Party never considered in any detail the 
administrative costs and practical complications involved in assessing individuals‟ 
wealth on a regular basis. It was enough to say, as Labour Party Research 
Department papers did, that other countries levied such taxes so it must be 
possible. The several thousand civil servants needed, depending on the valuation 
level at which the tax began, the numerous regional offices required and the 
process of regular valuation that might fall on individuals came as a surprise to the 
politicians and, indeed, to the Treasury when it got to think about the question 
properly. 
  
European taxes had been introduced when the main form of wealth was in the 
form of property. The taxes were very low. The attempt to introduce a much more 
onerous one ran into difficulty in Norway. But only a few years after the Treasury 
had concluded such an annual tax was administratively unworkable a rather 
similar „Solidarity Tax‟ was introduced in France under President Mitterand. 
Administrative obstacles depend, in no small measure, on political traditions and 
notions of „acceptability‟.         
 
The administrative issues had, however, been discussed and to some extent 
quantified by Atkinson (1972) and Sandford (1971). Their alternative was to tax 
recipients and to do so as an extension of the income tax system. Why did this not 
feature in the Labour Party‟s discussion? The most likely answer is that these 
ideas were relatively new and those advancing them were removed from, or new 
to, the Labour policy fraternity. The Institute for Fiscal Studies to which some of 
the critics belonged was a recent creation and carried nothing like its later 
authority. The Labour Party had been discussing a wealth tax for many years, from 
1959, in fact. It was part of the party policy intellectual furniture even if not 
widely discussed in public. Taking on new policy ideas from relative outsiders at 
all quickly was not something to which the party policy making apparatus was 
well adapted.   
 
When the idea of an accessions tax was discussed by the civil service the Inland 
Revenue dismissed it because they thought it would encourage the spreading of 
gifts and hence produce little revenue. The government did successfully press 
ahead with a Capital Transfer Tax (a gifts tax) levied on large gifts collected from 
the giver. It was later repealed by the next Conservative Government. 
 
The idea of taxing the recipients of significant transfers of wealth has been 
advanced again as part of the Mirrlees Review of the UK tax system. (Mirrlees 15 
 
Review 2011; Boadway, Chamberlain and Emmerson 2010). One lesson to be 
drawn from the 1974 experience is that the administrative detail in taxation 
matters a lot. The idea still lacks detailed study. The second lesson is that tax 
changes that are likely to affect major sections of the population and the wider 
economy have to be widely debated before, rather than after, any party reaches 
power. The attempt to introduce a wealth tax in 1974 was not preceded by any 
such process. It had been discussed in party committees and academic papers for 
more than a decade. The public case had never been argued through. It fell at the 
„there is a widely perceived problem‟ phase of policy making (Kingdon 1984). As 
the Treasury pointed out the distribution of wealth had been quietly becoming 
more equal over most of the century. Beyond the moderate left and those on the 
TUC it was not seen as a pressing social issue. Thus, even if a more effective, less 
costly, means of taxation had been under discussion, the accessions tax, it, too, 
might have fallen at the same hurdle.  
 
If any new move to tax wealth is to be successful it will only be so if the public, 
many of whom are now holders of modest wealth, are convinced that its unequal 
distribution is „a problem‟.  
 
This leads on to a more fundamental question. How far is any radical change in the 
pattern of economic rewards feasible in a modern mobile interdependent 
economy? The archives show how much this exercised the Treasury in 1974 long 
before capital, human and financial, was as mobile as it is today. The Treasury 
concerns went far beyond technical worries about the costs of collection.  
 
Most analysis of the Treasury‟s part in social policy has been concerned with its 
role as guardian of the public purse and micro economic issues such as the impact 
of social security or education and training on labour market efficiency (Heclo and 
Wildavsky 1974; Deakin and Parry 2000). Harris (1977) described the Treasury‟s 
part in containing Beveridge‟s ambitions. Lowe (1989; 1997) showed how its 
attempts to contain social spending were frustrated in the 1950s and how it 
responded. This study gives a glimpse of the Treasury‟s deeper concern – 
defending a mixed economy from the perceived destructive effects of major 
changes to the distribution of income and wealth. These may have, or be perceived 
to have, an impact on the overall efficiency and stability of the economy. Its role 
as „guardian of the economic order‟, which we see itself consciously adopting 
between 1974 and 1979, has been left to civil servants like Sir Douglass Wass 
(2008) to describe. Here we see it played out in detail over tax policy.    
 
It is possible, of course, to interpret these actions in quite a different way. The 
Treasury, Marxist historians would argue, is the quintessential defender of the 
economic order in a state apparatus that defends the status quo. As Ralph Miliband 
put it:  16 
 
„the dominant economic interests in capitalist society can normally 
count on the active good will and support of those in whose hands 
state power lies.‟ (Miliband 1969: 145).  
 
However interpreted the political limits to fundamental change in the distribution 
of wealth and income are perhaps more powerful than many social policy 
reformers are ready to accept. The debates of the 1950s and 1960s do suggest that 
there is an efficiency case to be advanced for taxing wealth in some way. Wealth 
and income are interchangeable and high taxes on income undesirable. The 
argument has been extended by the Mirrlees Review (2011). But any tax on wealth 
would challenge established interests, not least many home owners, be argued to 
weaken incentives to save, to found small businesses or cause capital flight. There 
will be administrative complications. Unless these fears are effectively answered a 
repeat of the 1974-6 saga is all too likely.  
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